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2 The End of Transition? 
Alan Gelb
The World Bank
When is transition over?  That question was frequently asked as we
prepared the 1996 World Development Report: From Plan to Market.
We did come up with an answer.  Transition is over when the problems
and the policy issues confronted by today’s “transition countries”
resemble those faced by other countries at similar levels of develop-
ment.
Why this answer?  Is there not a more definitive benchmark?
Some have suggested that transition ceases with membership in the
European Union (EU).  This Eurocentric approach, however, overlooks
the vast differences between transition countries.  The Czech Republic
and China have little in common except that they were planned social-
ist countries dominated by the Communist Party.  Vietnam’s level of
development is far from that of Hungary, and the latter is much more
developed in economic and social terms than Turkmenistan.  Such dif-
ferences—and many others—have influenced countries’ choice of
transition paths and the outcomes from their reforms. 
The differences are also important for the endpoints of transition.
After the initial phases of liberalizing the controlled economy and
attaining or maintaining macroeconomic stability, deep institutional
change is essential for the transition process.  Even comparing coun-
tries that have been market economies for long periods, formal market-
supporting institutions are typically far stronger in those nations that
are more developed and have higher income levels.  Few poor coun-
tries have well-functioning legal systems, or effective, well-regulated
financial markets.  The extent to which institutional development needs
to precede and set the stage for growth, rather than to simply follow
rising income, is a debated question, and one can find examples sug-
gesting an emphasis on one or the other of these sides.  Nevertheless,
the relationship between income levels and formal institutional devel-
opment points to the fact that transition has different endpoints for the
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countries concerned as well as different starting points.  Like automo-
biles, market economies come in many different models.  The Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) and Switzerland are each, in
its own way, market economies.
Whatever the endpoint, transition countries are not there yet.  Con-
sidering individual countries, we see features of their transition process
that may extend out a long way into the future.  The Czech voucher
funds, for example, will provide a distinctive dimension to ownership
for some time.  Countries such as Romania and Armenia, which priva-
tized agricultural land in small parcels to households, will need to
undergo an extended period of consolidation to achieve a long-run
equilibrium distribution of commercial landholding.  The reverse is the
case in countries such as Russia, where large state farms were trans-
formed into huge joint-stock corporations, resulting in a distribution of
landholding unlike that in any other market economy, where farms are
on average far smaller and are usually owned by families, even if for-
mally incorporated.  In some countries, such as Poland, it will take
time to resculpt the role of the state in social protection towards the
patterns typical of the more industrial market economies—even as
these patterns are themselves evolving.
To better focus on where the transition countries are relative to the
“reform frontier,” let us consider the following questions.  How far
have transition countries come along various dimensions of reform,
and what has driven reforms in diverse groups of countries?   How
have differences between countries influenced the response to reforms?
What is the remaining agenda for the countries in these groups?  Tran-
sition is an ongoing process, and our evaluation of the reforms and
their consequences must still be tentative—but we know a lot more
than we did a few years ago.
MOVEMENT TO THE MARKET
Transition involves a lot more than freeing prices, but liberaliza-
tion of the planned economy is at the core of the transition process.
Here, we can consider three groups of countries: the advanced reform-
ers in Central and Eastern Europe, the later reformers in the former
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Soviet Union, and the East Asian cases, China and Vietnam.  The first
and third groups started reforms before the second, and, in addition,
many in the first group of countries liberalized their economies very
rapidly. Reforms, however, affect economies over a period of time
rather than instantaneously and therefore need to be sustained: cumula-
tive exposure to reforms is more important than the immediate situa-
tion.  By 1996, as a result of these differences in speed and timing, the
cumulative exposure to market forces since the initiation of reforms
(that is, the number of reform-years expressed on a comparable basis)
was perhaps twice as great for the more advanced of the reformers in
Central and Eastern Europe than for typical countries in the former
Soviet Union.  The East Asian countries—despite the incomplete
nature of their reforms—had also exposed their economies to market
forces to a substantial extent.
Transition countries can also be compared along other policy
dimensions: how far have they come, for example, in legal reform, in
reducing the role of the state in production, in creating a market-based
financial system, or in changing the social protection function of the
state towards a role compatible with a market system?  When this com-
parison is made, a broad pattern develops, suggesting that, in general
terms, institutional evolution away from the planned model goes hand-
in-hand with cumulative exposure to liberalized market forces.  For
example, no country has moved significantly towards creating a mar-
ket-based financial system without sustained liberalization of the pric-
ing mechanism for goods and services.
This broad parallelism between market and institutional reforms is
not precise enough to determine the answer to all pressing policy
dilemmas: for example, at what stage is it appropriate to liberalize
financial markets? However, it does serve to show the limited value of
the debate on whether market or institutional reforms should come
first.  Certainly, the efficiency of market economies reflects the strength
of their underlying institutions, meaning that a sudden liberalization of
markets risks pitchforking a planned economy into a very inefficient
market mode of operation.  Some analysts therefore argue that market
reforms should only proceed after the institutional underpinnings of
markets are present.  Yet, market-supporting institutions cannot
develop without clear demand for their services.  Without market disci-
pline and private creditors, for example, countries will not develop the
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capacity to administer bankruptcy laws; without private shareholders,
the capacity to enforce minority ownership rights will remain undevel-
oped.  Incomplete liberalization or attempts to sustain the status quo
can also inhibit the development of market-supporting institutions: the
case has been made, for example, against attempts to sustain the ruble
zone rather than moving rapidly to a system of market-clearing
national currencies in the former Soviet Union.
Thus, there are strong synergies and bidirectional causality chains
between elements of the transition, so that, to be effective, reforms typ-
ically have to proceed across a fairly broad front.  This interdepen-
dence of policies is one of the factors that distinguishes transition from
the more normal process of selective policy reform within an estab-
lished market system.
What, then, has driven reforms?  The answer seems to be a mixture
of three factors.  The first is the steady decline in efficiency of the
planned economy relative to market systems.  Sharply falling produc-
tivity became evident in the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, and, by
the end of the 1980s, the Soviet economy had essentially stalled,
despite high investment rates.  The quality of machinery exported from
Eastern Europe to Western Europe declined steadily relative to that of
machinery from market economies, as shown by a persistent fall in its
value per unit of weight to a little over one-third of market economy
levels.  Propelled by a very high forced savings rate, China’s growth
was appreciable, yet, especially in rural areas, consumption lagged and
living standards fell considerably behind those of the rapidly growing
market economies in the region. 
The second factor driving reform is political change.  Across Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the timing and
intensity of economic reforms, as measured by estimates of liberaliza-
tion and other indicators, correlate closely with indicators of political
change, as assessed by advances in civil liberties and political free-
doms.  Such change was perhaps the major driving force for reforms in
Central and Eastern Europe, and it is no accident that economic
reforms progressed faster in countries such as Estonia, Poland, and the
Czech Republic, where political changes were the most radical.  Fun-
damental political change created an opening for radical economic
change, a so-called “period of extraordinary politics” devoid of effec-
tive pressure groups able to oppose the adverse impact that economic
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reforms would have on many established sectors and enterprises.  In
addition, optimism on the political side due to expectations of rejoining
Western Europe provided an important stabilizer in the initial, difficult,
transition years.  Countries such as China and Uzbekistan, in contrast,
were far less ready to subject the industrial core of the planned eco-
nomic system to the full market forces unleashed by reforms.
Macroeconomic crisis is the third factor that has shaped the
approach to reform and its speed.  As tight political control and the
planned economy began to erode in Central and Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union, so macroeconomic imbalances grew.  This
situation was propelled forwards by weakening central controls on
wages and on the investment demands of state enterprises, in the face
of the limited supply of goods and services made available by the stag-
nating economy.  Financial balances began to build up in household
and enterprise savings accounts.  Representing claims on resources that
had been made available to the planned economy, these large involun-
tary holdings or “money overhangs” would have rendered attempts at
slow liberalization very difficult, and they also had important inflation-
ary consequences when prices were released.  The money overhang
was especially severe in the common ruble zone of the Soviet Union.
It was significant in some of the Central and Eastern European coun-
tries but less so in others, and it was negligible in China, where, in con-
trast, households were underfinancialized at the start of reforms.
Because of the range of imbalances, the pace and phasing of
reforms differed between countries.  Driven by a combination of politi-
cal changes and severe macro-imbalances, many countries in Central
and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union initiated rapid liberal-
ization programs, followed by fiscal and monetary policies aimed at
stabilizing the price level.  Inheriting high open inflation, reformers in
Vietnam also initiated swift, if more limited, changes.  China’s
reforms, in contrast, opened with quick steps to partially liberalize the
rural economy and to decollectivize agriculture; thenceforth, changes
were in phases and relatively cautious, encouraging the entry of new




In Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the
typical response to liberalization was high inflation associated with
sharp economic contraction.  The extent of the latter is debatable;
indexes of economic activity that overemphasized the shrinking heavy
industrial sectors and underweighted the emerging small-scale manu-
facturing and service sectors imparted a negative bias.  Nevertheless,
the representative country recorded early output losses of 20–40 per-
cent of gross domestic product (GDP) and inflation rates that peaked at
several hundred percent, although there were wide variations around
these figures.  Not all of the output loss necessarily translated into wel-
fare losses: heavy industry, especially that connected with the military
sector, had been greatly overbuilt, and lost output was probably a social
good rather than a calamity.  Still, the sharp decline in major enter-
prises created severe stress for those working in the relevant sectors. 
Three to four years after reforms, however, things looked rather
different.  Inflation had been contained and brought down to moderate
levels in many countries, and an expanding private sector, heavily ori-
ented to services, was growing rapidly enough to be capable of offset-
ting the continued contraction of state industry.  In about half of the
countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union,
private business accounted for over 50 percent of economic activity by
1995, a remarkable increase from its share of 10–15 percent only a few
years earlier.  This gain was due both to new entry and, in many coun-
tries, significant privatization of the state sector using a variety of
mechanisms.  After bottoming out, many economies were beginning to
expand again.  Notably, growth resumed more strongly, and inflation
came down more rapidly, in countries that liberalized their economies
most resolutely, while the turnaround was more delayed in countries
reforming in a hesitant manner.  From a structural perspective, by the
mid 1990s the leading reformers in Central and Eastern Europe had
begun to approach the distribution of economic activity characteristic
of market systems.   
In contrast with this U-shaped pattern, China and Vietnam experi-
enced rapid growth from the start of their transition. These nations
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maintained inflation at moderately low levels (in Vietnam’s case, after
initially bringing it down from high levels).   
What has shaped the varying response of transition countries to
their reforms?   Has it simply been different policies?  Or, have the out-
comes of reform reflected variations among countries in terms of their
initial conditions?  The differential impact of policies and initial condi-
tions is still a contentious question, and econometric study to disentan-
gle their effects is only now becoming possible.  Nevertheless,
elements of the story are starting to be clear.
Abstracting from the political dimension, the heavily industrialized
countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
faced a very difficult choice.  If they liberalized their economies, major
segments, including massively overbuilt industries, would be exposed
as hopelessly uncompetitive.   There would then be pressure to subsi-
dize these industries, to sustain output, and especially to preserve jobs.
Where would resources come from for subsidies?  The state enterprises
were themselves major sources of fiscal revenues.  On the financial
sector side, sharp price increases resulting from the pent-up money
overhang would wipe out savings, reducing the willingness of eco-
nomic agents to continue to supply resources through the banking sys-
tem.  Bringing inflation down to levels where markets could function
effectively and private investment needed to “grow the new economy”
would not be discouraged would therefore require decisive action to
cut subsidies, which would be very difficult until the state severed its
links with the enterprises and allowed market forces to operate freely.
The choice, given severe structural imbalances and a monetary over-
hang, has therefore been either rapid liberalization followed by cutting
state subsidies and stabilizing the economy, or an extended period of
economic contraction while trying in vain to protect the old industrial
sector.  
 The interaction between policies and performance was very differ-
ent in China.  With far smaller state employment in relative terms and
no pent-up purchasing power, China was able to reap large efficiency
gains from rural reforms.  These were then channeled towards acceler-
ating industrialization, both by supplying resources to construct new
“township and village” industries and by creating a rapidly growing
market for industrial goods.  At the same time, high savings out of ris-
ing incomes could be directed to the state enterprises through the bank-
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ing system, cushioning them against the steadily increased competition
with the nonstate sector as nonagricultural markets were progressively
liberalized.  This protection gave even laggard Chinese enterprises
more time to adjust but stored up a problem for the future in the form
of a large volume of nonperforming loans in the banking system.  
Could an alternative policy have worked in Central and Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union?   For example, suppose govern-
ments had first privatized a wide range of small assets to absorb the
money overhang and at the same time had reimposed tight control on
wages and investment to prevent excess demand from reemerging.
This policy in turn might possibly have paved the way for a more con-
trolled process of reform, with gains from the growth of new sectors
offsetting steady losses and contraction of old ones.  Such a scenario
might have been possible in theory, although the large relative size of
the overbuilt sectors and the painful institutional changes needed—for
example, to reform Soviet-style agriculture—would have rendered it
very difficult and perhaps no less painful than the process that actually
took place.  However, such a hypothetical process was out of the ques-
tion in the face of the essential springboard of the transition in Central
and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union: weakening govern-
ments, followed by the breakdown of the political system itself.  
Within this broad sweep of experience, there have been other con-
trasting outcomes.  Geography and history have played important
roles: recovery is easier for a country such as the Czech Republic,
which has long borders with rich market economies, than for the Kyr-
gyz Republic, isolated in Central Asia with most communications
routes going through Russia.  Russia itself has been slower to recover
than expected.  One reason may be that the energy sector was the major
provider of subsidies to other sectors under the planned system: with
liberalization, benefits to the energy sector have flowed into relatively
few hands, widening the disparity in the distribution of income and
fueling an increase in imports and an export of capital that has left
poorly equipped light industry and agriculture behind.  Widespread
corruption and conflicts over corporate governance have also increased
the barriers to private investment and growth.  Perhaps we now have
too many explanations for transition outcomes!  But at least we under-
stand the factors better, even if we do not know their exact relative
weights in determining the results. 
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THE AGENDA TO COME
What of the future?  What are the remaining issues on the reform
agenda?   Phase 1 reforms involving the introduction of market forces
and the opening of economies to private firms are well on the way in all
but the least advanced transition countries.  Phase 2 reforms, including
those of the legal system, of the financial system, and of government
itself, involve institutional change as well as the virtual creation of new
professions, such as lawyers, bank supervisors, and accountants capa-
ble of functioning in a market economy.  The necessary institutional
change runs deep, extending down into the educational systems of the
transition countries as well as to courts, banks, and governments them-
selves.  Therefore, it cannot be a rapid process.  
At the risk of generalization, the reform agenda can be discussed
according to the three groups of countries.  All have a great deal of eco-
nomic promise.  Central and Eastern European countries can benefit
from “catch-up” with their large, rich, market-economy neighbors.
The former Soviet Union can exploit an abundant natural-resource and
human-capital base far more effectively than hitherto.  The crises of
late 1997 notwithstanding, the East Asian transition countries also have
strong bases to tap, including a hardworking, educated population, a
tradition of high saving, and proximity to a region with high long-run
growth potential.  Yet, to achieve their potential as market economies,
all three groups face major challenges.  
The leading reformers in Central and Eastern Europe are well
along with Phase 1 changes.  Phase 2 includes harmonization with the
EU in preparation for accession.  The primary challenge remaining is
to reduce the role of the state in their economies to the point where this
does not constitute a serious constraint on competitiveness and growth.
State spending, largely for social programs and, in particular, pensions,
still comprises close to 50 percent of GDP in some of the countries, as
large as before transition.  This high share has been sustained by a
heavy, and distorting, tax structure that, among other things, creates a
strong disincentive to hire labor through the formal economy.  Compet-
itor countries at similar income levels, including those in the Far East,
impose substantially lower fiscal burdens on their productive sectors,
making space for far higher levels of investment.      
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The challenge in much of the former Soviet Union is very differ-
ent.  The collapse of the Soviet Union seriously undermined the capa-
bility and the credibility of governments.  Fiscal revenues fell sharply,
and governments lost effectiveness in administering law and order as
well as in the area of social protection.  The credibility of Russia’s pol-
icy regime, as viewed through a survey of businesses, ranked with the
poorest in the world and fell far short of that viewed as prevailing in the
Czech Republic.  In some cases in the former Soviet Union, property
rights have been reallocated towards the private sector on a massive
scale, as in Russia, but the distributional and corporate governance
consequences of the mechanisms used have been contentious.  In some
cases, as in agriculture, formal privatization has not yet led to an effec-
tive reallocation of rights towards individuals.  Reforms in the former
Soviet Union are therefore at a more elemental state than in the more
advanced countries in Central and Eastern Europe.  
Despite very rapid growth, China faces a pressing set of issues,
including a massive deferred agenda of urban reforms.  These include
changes in the social security system (even in the late 1990s, Chinese
enterprises are still largely responsible for pensions, housing, and
healthcare, making it difficult to close them down) and the banking
system, which is burdened by a massive “black hole” of nonperforming
loans.  The announcement of a $35 billion bond issue in February 1998
suggests an approach towards the problem posed by the stock of bad
loans; however, measures to stem the flow of new bad loans would
have severe implications for many enterprises that depend on contin-
ued lending.  Some 100 million workers in nonstate firms are outside
the formal social system yet no longer tied to agriculture; a “floating
population” of some 70 million has broken down previous constraints
on labor mobility.  In addition, the state’s ability to redistribute
resources from growing coastal provinces towards poor remote regions
needs to be restored; central government’s fiscal revenues have fallen
throughout the reform period, reaching low shares of GDP by the mid
1990s.
Finally, let us consider social factors arising from transition that
may affect post-transition performance.  Experience so far suggests
that the process of transition is not easily reversed.  Even the return of
ex-socialists to power in certain countries in Central and Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union has not caused the economic
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reform clock to be turned back, although it has, in some cases, slowed
the pace of change.  What kinds of economies and societies will the
transition countries turn out to be?  Will the distribution of property
emerge as sharply unequal?  Property rights to large assets have been
difficult to disperse rapidly on a wide scale, except perhaps through the
use of voucher schemes as implemented in the Czech Republic.  Yet
experience shows that, if formal property rights are not allocated rather
early in the transition, they tend to become appropriated anyway by
powerful individuals or groups as the hold of the state on the economy
weakens.  Related to this question is that of the social and economic
impact of increasing income inequality.  From initially low or moder-
ate levels, Gini coefficients1 have tended to increase for most countries
in transition, somewhat in Central and Eastern Europe and sharply in
the former Soviet Union.  Cross-country studies of market economies
suggest that nations with highly unequal income distributions perform
relatively poorly, in part because distributional concerns fuel social
tensions that cause policies to be less stable.  Here is a major challenge
for many of the transition countries in the future.
NOTES
NOTE: The material for this lecture is based on the World Bank World Development
Report 1996: From Plan to Market (Oxford: Oxford University Press) and associated
research.  The lecture, however, expresses the views of the author.  It does not necessar-
ily represent the views of the World Bank, its executive directors, or the countries that
they represent.
1. The Gini coefficient is a measure of the inequality of income distribution.
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